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CHAPTER 5 
Equity and Equity Practice 
HARRY ZARROW 
§5.1. General. During the 1958 SURVEY year, no truly novel or 
difficult problems in the fields of equity and equity practice were 
presented to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court was called upon 
to reiterate principles previously announced and expounded in the 
area. In this respect, it should be noted that the common law which 
our ancestors brought to this country included chancery powers as 
well as legal powers,! all exercised by the same court. It was not 
until 1877 that original jurisdiction in equity was conferred by stat-
ute2 upon the Supreme Judicial Court. Subsequently the Superior 
Court also became a court of equitable jurisdiction. Prior to 1877, 
specific or limited powers were conferred by successive statutes;3 how-
ever, until 1877 the exercise of jurisdiction was limited to cases in 
which there was no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. 
More than eighty years have thus elapsed since 1877, when the gen-
eral equity powers were first conferred. The Supreme Judicial Court 
has in that period been afforded numerous opportunities to consider 
every facet of equity jurisprudence and equity jurisdiction. In an 
ever changing society, the immediate problems or transactions with 
which equity deals will vary; the general rules, the maxims, the prin-
ciples and the very philosophy of equity, however, remain unchanged. 
It is, therefore, not surprising to find few if any startling or radical 
pronouncements in this field. 
§5.2. Personal rights: Availability of equitable relief. In Messina 
v. La Rosal the Supreme Judicial Court considered the ownership and 
exercise of rights in connection with interment, disinterment, ceme-
teries and commemorative markers. There is no novelty in the fact 
that relatives cannot agree, even on the matter of burying their dead, 
HARRY ZARROW is a partner in the firm of Yagjian, Toscano, Lian and Zarrow, 
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§5.1. 1 See Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 346-351, 62 N.E. 401, 405-407 
(1902). 
2 Mass. Stats. of 1877, c. 178. See, however, Mass. Stats. of 1798, c. 77, which con-
ferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Judicial Court in the matter of foreclosure or 
redemption of mortgages. 
3 See Jones v. Newhall, 115 Mass. 244, 251 (1874). 
§5.2. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 150 N.E.2d 5. 
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§5.3 EQUITY AND EQUITY PRACTICE 59 
and have resorted to the courts to resolve their disputes.2 It had been 
previously ruled that while there is no fight of property in a dead 
body, controversies as to the right of disposing of it are within the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity.3 The Court seized the opportunity, 
however, in Messina to state that the case did not involve "an appli-
cation of any rule of property law, but is a recognition of principles 
of ethics, proprietary and common decency which equity is peculiarly 
qualified to enforce." 4 
This case comes within the province of "all cases and matters of 
equity cognizable under the general principles of equity jurispru-
dence." Ii It is indeed a recognition that here is a matter of grave 
concern to certain people; that here exist controversies which a court 
of law cannot cope with because of its limited remedial power of 
awarding money damages. Equity with its power of decree and in-
junction can order the doing or undoing of the act that has affronted 
the memory of a dear one. 
It was once thought that a suit for injunctive relief must be based 
upon a property right as distinguished from a personal right;6 today, 
however, it is taken for granted that personal rights are no less im-
portant to the individual than property rights nor are they "less vital 
to society or less worthy of protection by the peculiar remedies equity 
can afford than are property rights." 7 
§5.3. Parties: Indispensable or necessary. The subject of parties 
in connection with equity procedure came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Franks v. Markson.1 The case involved a bill in equity 
which sought to enjoin among other things the right to the use of a 
trade name. The individual plaintiffs were residents of this Com-
monwealth, and the corporate plaintiff was incorporated and doing 
business in Massachusetts. The defendants totaled nineteen in num-
ber, and consisted of two individuals and seventeen corporations. 
Only one individual and one corporate defendant were present in this 
jurisdiction and were duly served. The issue as to parties was raised 
by a plea in abatement, a motion to decline jurisdiction, and a plea 
of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
these pleadings were properly denied, but that a demurrer should 
have been sustained because the bill did not set forth a case for equi-
table relief. 
The doctrine that equity procedure requires jurisdiction of all 
persons whose rights are to be affected by the final decree was re-
2 See Green v. Horton, 326 Mass. 503, 95 N.E.2d 537 (1950); Magrath v. Sheehan, 
296 Mass. 263, 5 N.E.2d 547 (1936). 
11 Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881). 
41958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 718, 150 N.E.2d 5, 7. 
Ii G.L., c. 214, §1, as amended. 
6 Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421, 32 N.E. 744 (1892). 
7 Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 533, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1946). See 
1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.2. 
§5.3. 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 539, 149 N.E.2d 619. 
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affirmed. "It is a fundamental principle of equitable procedure that 
a court will not proceed to a final determination, which may affect 
third persons, without causing them to be made parties to the bill in 
order that after a hearing, at which they have had their day in court, 
their claims may be adjudicated." 2 
The Franks case again points out the difference between necessary 
absent parties in contradistinction to indispensable absent parties. 
Here the Court recognizes that transactions, businesses and human 
relations are not confined within state boundaries. Justice must not 
be defeated or denied by the spread of these relationships across state 
boundaries, and even national boundaries. The principle as to absent 
defendants is that all parties having a material interest in the subject 
matter of the suit must be made parties, and a court may then proceed 
to a decree as to parties before it, even if other persons over whom it 
has no jurisdiction are absent; if the absent parties are, however, in-
dispensable, then the court must decline to act.3 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Franks held that the absence of some defendants did not 
preclude the court below from proceeding to adjudicate the rights of 
those who were before it but its adjudication would not affect the 
rights of those who were not. 
§5.4. Unfair competition. Unfair competition is a subject which, 
it would seem, has been completely and thoroughly examined time 
and again. It was, nonetheless, again considered by the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1958 SURVEY year. Franks v. Markson1 
resulted only in a further refinement of the doctrine that the trade 
name and good will of a business will be protected from usurpation 
or piracy by others.2 The rule, however, further requires that the 
plaintiff's trade name acquire a secondary meaning before it can expect 
to obtain protection by decree of a court of equity.3 It was thus held 
that the use of the trade names "Jim Clinton" and "Bill Benton" for 
the same kind of businesses using the same modes of merchandising 
and advertising would not cause any confusion in the mind of the 
public nor cause any reasonable person to mistake one name for 
another. 
§5.5. Statutory injunctions: Discretion of the court. In Skil Corp. 
v. Barnet,1 the statutory provision for injunctive relief under Section 
7A of G.L., c. 110 was considered by the Court.2 This is another ex-
2 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 543, 149 N.E.2d at 622, and cases cited. 
3 J. P. Eustis Manufacturing Co. v. Saco Brick Co., 198 Mass. 212, 219·221, 84 
N.E. 449, 451-452 (1908); Superior Court Rule 15 (1954). 
§5.4. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 539,149 N.E.2d 619. 
2 S. M. Spencer Manufacturing Co. v. Spencer, 319 Mass. 331, 66 N.E.2d 19 (1946). 
3 Jackman v. Calvert-Distillers Corp., 306 Mass. 423, 28 N.E.2d 430 (1940). 
§5.5. 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 150 N.E.2d 551. 
2 General Laws, c. llO, §7A provides: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation 
or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be 
a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair com-
petition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of 
confusion as to the source of goods or services." 
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ample of statutory jurisdiction in equity over various subjects. In the 
matter of a specific statutory remedy given in equity, the objection 
that the plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law is of no 
consequence, but apparently the question of discretion even in stat-
utory equity jurisdiction still remains an inherent power of the court. 
The Federal District Court and Court of Appeals have construed this 
statute as permitting but not requiring injunctions;3 the Supreme 
Judicial Court indicated a willingness to go at least as far as the federal 
court has gone in its interpretation of Section 7 A, but was careful to 
avoid setting the limits of its applicability for the present. Up to 
now, almost all the cases brought under the statute have been in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts, but this prob-
lem of "dilution of a trade-mark," and the "free ride" on the name 
of a nationally advertised product, will probably result in more cases 
before the state courts on this matter. 
§5.6. Specific performance. Specific performance of contracts 
comes within the class of cases and matters cognizable under the 
general principles of equity jurisprudence. Each year, therefore, one 
or more cases in this field are considered by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. In Gromelski v. Bruno,l the plaintiff sought specific perform-
ance of an oral contract for a lease of an apartment. The plaintiff 
had spent some money in repairing and renovating the apartment in 
consideration of obtaining the lease. The defendant did not plead 
the Statute of Frauds. The master made a finding that the parties 
could not live in the same house in harmony. Under these circum-
stances, it was held that specific performance ought not to be granted, 
but that the suit should be retained for assessment of damages. Here 
again is a demonstration of the doctrine that the granting of specific 
performance is a matter of discretion and not a matter of right. The 
case also demonstrates that the equity court may exercise its discretion 
to retain the suit for the purpose of assessing damages. 
An interesting case is that of Orlando v. Ottaviani.2 This case does 
not change or modify the general principle of specific performance. 
Its interest lies in the fact that an oral agreement to convey land was 
ordered specifically performed on the ground that the defendants 
were estopped from setting up the Statute of Frauds by reason of the 
plaintiff's part performance and change of position in reliance upon 
the contract.3 The plaintiff had given up an oral contract of first 
refusal to purchase the land that the defendants ultimately purchased 
in consideration of the defendants' promise to convey a fifteen-foot 
strip to them. There may be some doubt as to the value of what the 
plaintiff gave up. 
3 Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Manufacturing Co., 139 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 
1956), remanded, 243 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1957). 
§5.6. 1336 Mass. 678, 147 N.E.2d 747 (1958). 
2 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 405, 148 N.E.2d 373. For further comment on this case, 
see §§1.2, 4.3 supra. 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 408,148 N.E.2d at 376. 
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In Forte v. Caruso,4 it was again held that (1) specific performance 
may be decreed notwithstanding the conveyance of the land to one 
who was not a bona fide purchaser, and that (2) inchoate interests of 
dower or curtesy may not be asserted to impair the interest of the 
sellers under an option to purchase the land. This case merely re-
affirms the law heretofore announced with reference to point (1),5 and 
logically extends it in connection with point (2).6 
§5.7. Legislation. In the legislative field the Probate Court was 
given concurrent jurisdiction in equity of controversies over property 
between divorced persons by Chapter 223 of the Acts of 1958. The 
Probate Court had jurisdiction of property rights between spouses, 
but only in conjunction with a pending divorce or separate main-
tenance action. It would seem proper that the court that is con-
cerned with domestic relations should have the power to resolve 
property rights of the spouses at any time, whether before or after 
the divorce. 
Statutory jurisdiction to enjoin deceptive or false advertising of 
merchandise for sale was conferred on the Superior Court by Chap-
ter 217 of the Acts of 1958.1 The action may be brought in the Su-
perior Court by the Attorney General or any aggrieved party. This 
act provides for punishment by imposition of a fine. It recognizes, 
however, that protection of the public requires that preventive meas-
ures be taken in advance or at the outset of false or deceptive adver-
tising, as well as providing for punishment after the commission of 
the prohibited act. 
4336 Mass. 476, 146 N.E.2d 501 (1957). For further comment on this case, see 
§1.6 supra. 
5 See Bickford v. Dillon, 321 Mass. 82, 83, 71 N.E.2d 6Il, 612 (1947). 
6 Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 315, 50 N.E. 650, 651-652 (1898). 
§5.7. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 217, §91B. 
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